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Is There a Chance for TA?
Reflections on the Perspectives for TA 
in Eastern/Central Europe
by Edgaras Leichteris, Knowledge Economy 
Forum, Vilnius, Lithuania
Technology assessment has been widely un-
known in many Central and Eastern Europe-
an countries until now. This paper is a reflec-
tion about the possible roles and potential of 
TA in some of these countries (Bulgaria, The 
Czech Republic, Hungary, and Lithuania) 
based on discussions as well as the activi-
ties in the course of the PACITA project. The 
article views the current situation against the 
background of the historical heritage such 
as the Soviet Regime as well as compares 
the specific political culture and climate of 
these countries with those in some of the 
Western European countries in which tech-
nology assessment units were introduced in 
the 1970s and 1980s. So far, TA is only re-
garded as an unrecognized need by many in 
Eastern and Central Europe: often a lack of 
understanding of the TA concept by decision 
makers, the inflexibility of the current sys-
tem, the danger of a politicization of such 
attempts, the concentration of decisions in 
the government rather than parliament as 
well as problems with financing and a lack 
of TA-trained human resources are named 
as reasons for this state of affairs. For the 
future, two perspectives are proposed: First 
to focus on the important role of the EU with 
regard to its financial power as well as the 
mutual learning occurring across national 
contexts. Second, a transition strategy for 
TA in these countries should be elaborated 
to support the national TA initiatives which 
have started in the meantime. Different roles 
for TA are proposed here which rely on na-
tional activities but also on an international 
TA network accompanying the future devel-
opment of TA in these countries.
1 Introduction
Technology assessment (TA) and parliamenta-
ry technology assessment (PTA) are still new 
concepts in most of the Central and Eastern Eu-
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ropean countries – although first efforts have 
already been made in some countries, e.g., the 
participation in EU-funded TA projects or expe-
rience with TA-related activities such as technol-
ogy foresight. The EU-funded project PACITA 
(Parliaments and Civil Society in Technology 
Assessment) tried to explore the main barriers 
to and opportunities for TA in several European 
countries with the aim of expanding the current 
TA landscape to Central and Eastern Europe. 
The present paper provides an “outsider’s” look, 
namely by a PACITA project partner who was 
introduced to the concept of TA for the first time 
by the PACITA project. The reflections present-
ed in the following pages are based on the learn-
ing process the author underwent in the course 
of PACITA, i.e., discussions on the TA concept 
with colleagues from established (Western) TA 
institutions, the outcomes of the TA activities 
within the PACITA project, discussions with his 
“fellow non-PTA” colleagues, and last but not 
least the impressions and insights gained from 
the author’s efforts to initiate a TA debate among 
researchers, policy makers, and civil society or-
ganizations in Lithuania.
From this perspective it appears that for 
the Central and Eastern European countries in-
volved in PACITA (Czech Republic, Bulgaria, 
Hungary, Lithuania) the findings of the project 
suggest that there are much stronger obstacles to 
the introduction of TA as a concept of indepen-
dent and public policy advice than can be over-
come by just transferring knowledge on method-
ologies and concepts from “PTA” to “non-PTA” 
countries. These obstacles are rooted to a great 
part in the remnants of influence of the former 
Soviet system on research and innovation and in 
the current struggles to reform the R&D system, 
especially in the context of the financial crisis. 
Melnikas et al. (2011) state that in Central and 
Eastern Europe the main barriers to starting po-
litical innovations and to strengthening the role 
of civil society in the democratic system lie in 
the fact that most of these countries try to adopt 
the Western model of democracy in the hostile 
environment set up under the influence of the 
former Soviet Union.
2 An Unfavorable Environment for TA: Old 
Structures Struggling with New Problems
Is there a real chance to establish TA in the Cen-
tral and Eastern European countries? This is the 
first question I raise with a view to the history 
of TA and to the arguments prevalent in the pro-
cess of establishing TA in European countries 
during the 1970s and 1980s. Hennen and Nier-
ling (2014) have narrowed down factors for the 
establishment of TA in “old” countries to four 
main factors: (a) highly developed, differentiat-
ed, and governmentally supported R&D system; 
(b) problem-oriented research and self-reflective 
science in the academic sector; (c) critical pub-
lic interest in issues from science and technol-
ogy (S&T); and (d) strong and explicit demand 
from policy makers for scientific knowledge and 
methods to deal with public concerns.
For the first two factors – a highly devel-
oped and Government-supported R&D system 
and problem-oriented research in the academic 
sector – the situation in the Central and East-
ern European countries nowadays differs quite 
clearly from that in Western TA history. While 
Hungary and the Czech Republic have some ex-
perience in TA-like activities (especially in tech-
nological foresight), Lithuania and Bulgaria are 
just making their first transitional steps towards 
problem-oriented and interdisciplinary re-
search. In Lithuania, problem-oriented research 
is strongly supported by the government in the 
field of research and innovation policy. This 
often relies, however, on the consultancy work 
done by private companies and, furthermore, is 
usually initiated by measures of the European 
Union or the OECD (Technopolis group 2013; 
Valinčius 2013; Reid et al. 2012).1
In the current situation, the R&D system 
in Central and Eastern European countries is in 
need of huge investments into infrastructure. 
R&D policies respond to this demand and are 
aimed at supporting investments through various 
“catching up strategies,” often financed by Euro-
pean funds like the science and business coop-
eration “valleys” programs in Lithuania (LMES 
2014), the National Research Infrastructure Sur-
vey and Roadmap in Hungary (HNIO 2014), or 
the National Development Program Bulgaria 
2020 (BMOF 2014).
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plant (Leichteris/Stumbrytė 2012) can serve as an 
example here. The fatal accident in the Chernobyl 
nuclear power plant in 1986 initiated a public de-
bate about the security of the Lithuanian nuclear 
power plant, which was equipped with a Cher-
nobyl type of reactor. The debate started around 
“technological” issues but soon developed into 
a fight for Lithuanian independence because the 
green movement became a hidden organization-
al force for much broader civil action. Soon after 
Lithuania became independent, the “technological 
issue” became “economical and political”: from 
2005 to 2012 the Government showed very clear 
support for the development of a nuclear energy 
system in Lithuania. Under the pressure from 
the EU, the old-type Chernobyl power plant was 
closed, but negotiations to build a new one were 
started. The public did not follow the negotiations 
and was disinterested in the decisions until the 
Fukushima nuclear disaster in 2011. Since one of 
the main potential builders of a new power plant 
was the Japanese company Hitachi, the accident 
in Japan revived the debates over nuclear energy 
in Lithuania. In a public referendum in 2012, the 
wave of public disagreement voted against build-
ing an nuclear power plant. In Austria during the 
late 1970s a similar plebiscite triggered a debate 
over a systematic analysis of technological poli-
cies (Nentwich et al. 2012). In Lithuania this was 
not the case. The political party which agitated 
the most against nuclear energy later formed the 
government and now faces a dilemma. On the one 
hand, there is a clear necessity to have an indepen-
dent energy system. It is supported by the fear of 
political influence exerted by Russia (especially in 
the light of recent Russian military actions in the 
Ukraine). On the other hand, the main potential 
strategic partners – Latvia, Poland, and Estonia 
– have expressed concerns about acting against 
public opinion. At the moment the arguments in 
favor of building a nuclear power plant seem to 
be stronger than the technological controversies 
over nuclear energy, and connected with this the 
reluctance to go against public opinion is vanish-
ing. However, the government has now gone for 
two years without making any decision.
When reflecting on the explicit demand by 
policy makers for scientific knowledge and meth-
ods to deal with public concerns, factors very well-
As those countries do not have much expe-
rience in investing into big R&D infrastructure 
projects, the effectiveness of such investments is 
low, the return on investments is unknown, and 
their future is uncertain. With a view to worldwide 
trends, Central and Eastern European countries 
try to catch up with innovation, thus competing 
with each other in similar areas (nanotechnology, 
biotechnology, information and communication 
technologies, renewable energy, etc.) without 
having real capacities to establish themselves as 
strong players in these fields of technology. This 
reveals the gap in strategic technological priorities 
between Western and Eastern European countries: 
Western countries rely on already existing technol-
ogies, practices, institutes, research, and business-
es. Central and Eastern countries are often victims 
of wishful thinking by their politicians and still 
need to find their way to differentiate themselves 
from other countries and to stay competitive on 
the European or global “playing field”.
On a general level, public interest in S&T 
in most European countries is low, with an av-
erage of 40 % of respondents interested in S&T 
(EC 2013). In the Central and Eastern European 
countries analyzed here, the figures are even be-
low the European average (see table 1):
Table 1: Public interest towards S&T in Central 
and Eastern European countries analyzed
Country % of people interested in science 
and technology issues
EU 40 %
Lithuania 33 %
Czech Republic 29 %
Bulgaria 25 %
Hungary 25 %
Source: EC 2013, p. 9
However, recent case studies in the named coun-
tries have shown that public debates on some con-
troversial issues can become lively and even hot, 
leading to strong disagreements with official po-
sitions of the government. However, such debates 
are too often the object of changing political tac-
tics and strategies and do not lead to the consistent 
political uptake of arguments and positions. The 
Lithuanian debate on building a nuclear power 
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known from Western European countries also ap-
ply to the new democracies in Eastern and Central 
Europe. In general, politicians are action oriented 
and need to solve problems as quickly as possible, 
and their search for knowledge for doing is not for 
the sake of knowing itself (Bimber 1996). In the 
Lithuanian context, it is difficult to involve them 
in activities which are not relevant for their current 
political agenda or are not being widely debated in 
the public sphere. And if they are involved, they 
tend to take shortcuts by using weak evidence, 
referring to selected experts’ opinions, or making 
their own subjective decisions without having the 
relevant knowledge. Eastern and Central Europe-
an policy making, moreover, suffers from tradi-
tions which add additional obstacles to the utiliza-
tion of independent policy advice and transparent 
deliberation on S&T issues. In both Western and 
Eastern European countries there is a wide use of 
experts whose role is to give independent advice 
on S&T issues and fuel scientific knowledge into 
policy making. But how those experts are chosen 
and how their “objectivity” is supported through-
out the whole process differs in the Western and 
Eastern traditions. In Western European countries 
experts are usually involved by policy makers to 
legitimize an argument by providing scientific au-
thority. The Eastern tradition of scientific policy 
consulting was born under the influence of the 
Soviet political system, where science for a long 
time served as an instrument supporting political 
propaganda (i.e., the scientists were not consulted 
for their expertise, but were ordered to create evi-
dence supporting the Soviet political regime).
This makes science-based policy advice an 
area that is also regarded with distrust by the 
general public in Central and Eastern European 
countries. Whereas the problem in the Western 
European countries might be the contradicto-
ry nature of advice given by different types or 
groups of experts (expert dilemma), in Central 
and Eastern European countries it is a general 
distrust in the independence of scientific ad-
vice. On the one hand, independent expertise is 
desperately needed and demanded, while on the 
other hand transparent procedures of selecting 
experts and open processes of policy consulting 
are lacking. Such structures of democratic pro-
cessing of scientific knowledge are difficult to 
establish in a political culture that is still mold-
ed by the old system of instrumentalizing sci-
ence and scientists.
An active civil society embedded in a cul-
ture of transparent and open policy making is far 
from being well developed in the countries under 
consideration here. According to Transparency 
International (2014), the “non-PTA” Central and 
Eastern European countries involved in PACITA 
(Lithuania, Hungary, Czech Republic, Bulgaria) 
show a middle level of corruption (scoring from 
40–59), while their PTA “twinning partners” in 
the Western European countries show very low 
(Denmark, Norway, Switzerland, The Nether-
lands) or low (Germany, Austria) levels of cor-
ruption (scoring from 69–91). In addition, Lith-
uania struggles with very low levels of civic par-
ticipation (PVI 2014). Bulgaria’s development of 
a democratic culture suffers from the dominance 
of politically and governmentally owned NGOs 
(CSD 2010). Hungary recently started impos-
ing more controls on NGOs and the free media. 
Therefore it is not only about making policy 
makers aware of their need to cooperate with sci-
entific experts but also about creating awareness 
of the need to ensure there are clear, transparent 
procedures of expert selection. The debates, con-
flicts, and networks needed for the introduction 
of TA as a means of achieving public account-
ability of policy making might themselves func-
tion as a good exercise helping these countries to 
impose bigger changes with regard to structures 
that allow for public deliberation as a basis for 
democratic decision making.
Thus, even if Central and Eastern European 
countries are heading towards institutionalizing 
TA, there are still big challenges to solve. How 
can an institution or network of institutions be 
created which is capable of providing high quali-
ty, valid, and credible evidence to policy makers? 
Representatives of Central and Eastern European 
countries are often afraid that the process of insti-
tutionalization of TA can be undermined by pol-
iticians and that, as a consequence, TA can lose 
its main features – namely objectivity, impartial-
ity and independence – or can be taken over by 
formal organizations lacking competence on TA.
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In Lithuania, it seemed that consensus was 
reached regarding how to solve these shortcom-
ings by using an innovative TA institutionaliza-
tion model: This network model of open cooper-
ation among different institutions was supported 
by NGOs, consultative agencies of the govern-
ment, and the Lithuanian Academy of Sciences. 
Later however that model was indirectly opposed 
by the Lithuanian Science Academy.
The Lithuanian Science Academy followed 
the model of a Soviet Science Academy for 
more than 40 years. Although it was formally re-
formed after independence, the culture, people, 
traditions, and procedures remained the same. 
The soviet tradition was based on the imperial 
Russian model, created in the XVIII century, 
which unlike its Western counterparts (which 
acted as institutions of scientific research) was 
given numerous powers of supervision and con-
trol (Vucinich 1956). These powers were even 
further strengthened during the Soviet period, 
supported by the utopian vision of a world dom-
ination in science and by a centralized system of 
financing and control instead of methods based 
on scientific peer reviews and research grants 
(Graham 1993). When new players emerge in the 
field (be they private institutes or NGOs, claim-
ing the potential for offering science-based evi-
dence to politicians), a confrontational situation 
comes to the fore: the old players want to keep 
their monopoly in providing policy advice and 
are reluctant to open the system to the public.2
The recently discussed draft of the Law on 
Science and Education now foresees assigning an 
exclusive, higher advisory role to the Lithuanian 
Science Academy and the Lithuanian Research 
Council. According to the proposed changes in 
the current draft of the law, the Lithuanian Sci-
ence Academy might be given expert functions 
for all strategic questions on science and educa-
tion, whereas the Research council might get the 
function to evaluate R&D activities. This devel-
opment does not close the door to the use of the 
network model, or to having other institutions 
perform TA in Lithuania, but it might also con-
stitute some additional formal roadblocks. How-
ever it may also open the opportunity to have a 
strong network, based on trust and cooperation, 
which is capable of identifying policy options, 
3 Starting a TA Debate in Lithuania: 
An Unrecognized Need for TA?
Reflected against what I have learned from guid-
ing a process of introducing the TA concept to 
relevant actors in Lithuania and according to 
what I have observed from respective processes 
in other countries in the course of the PACITA 
project, there is little evidence that the environ-
ment in these countries is as favorable for the in-
stitutionalization of TA as it was in other Europe-
an countries during the 1970s and 1980s.
Evidence from the “old PTA countries” 
(Ganzevles/van Est 2012; Mintrom 1997; 
Cruz-Castro/Sanz-Menéndez 2005) shows, that 
even with a favorable environment most institu-
tions needed “political momentum” and “political 
entrepreneurs”, which currently are not very like-
ly to enter the scene of S&T policy making soon 
due to the above mentioned problems. And even 
when they are in place, the road of institutional-
ization is full of long battles and attempts to gain 
political influence over the TA institution. By 
now, we can at best identify what has been coined 
an “unrecognized need” for TA in interviews in 
Lithuania (Leichteris/Stumbrytė 2012, p. 203). In 
the course of the interviews and workshops on TA 
that have been organized in Lithuania, the debate 
constantly circled around making the TA concept 
understandable to politicians and other actors and 
communicating the usefulness of TA products. 
Although many of the TA discussants in Lithuania 
were in favor of independent policy advice and 
transparent structures of deliberation (as a rem-
edy for the blockades caused by “old thinking” 
and “old structures”), they could hardly imagine 
that such initiatives would be prompted by poli-
ticians. In turn, the interviewed politicians were 
rather skeptical about the Lithuanian parliament 
as a seedbed for evidence-based policy making 
and expressed disbelief of the effectiveness of a 
TA unit if it would have been created in the parlia-
ment due to its weak role in S&T policy making. 
Rather, an institution under the government or an 
independent institution was mentioned as offer-
ing a more favorable option, provided that it will 
be able to concentrate competence from different 
areas and will be funded accordingly, thus over-
coming the problem of capacities scattered across 
several institutions and authorities.
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has clear channels, and is assigned a mandate in 
the law with regard to how to push things for-
ward on the political agenda.
As Smits et al. (1995) point out the most 
important attributes of TA are quality, validity, 
and credibility. Bimber (1996) and Rodemay-
er et al. (2005) state its “neutral competence”, 
namely the ability to provide unbiased and bal-
anced policy advice. Such features are not creat-
ed simply by putting them into the law or other 
regulations. They need to have a favorable po-
litical environment, they are harvested slowly 
during the lifetime of an institution whose sus-
tainability comes from the constant cooperation 
between different actors.
All in all, the main obstacles to establishing 
TA in the countries under consideration here are 
a lack of expertise and understanding of the TA 
concept by parliamentarians, the inflexibility of 
the current system that hinders the establishment 
of new institutional structures, the usual “politi-
cization” of such attempts, the concentration of 
decisions in the government rather than parlia-
ment, the financing issue, and the lack of TA-
trained human resources.
4 Europe as a Factor to Keep the TA 
Process Going
If most of the factors which worked for the “old” 
countries are not in place for the establishment 
of TA in Central and Eastern Europe, is it possi-
ble to identify new factors which can help insti-
tutionalize TA in these countries in a mid-term 
perspective?
A first, strong factor can probably be attribut-
ed to the general European policy and its financ-
ing instruments – namely Europe’s Horizon 2020 
strategy (Horizon 2020 2014) as well as the strat-
egy of smart specialization as a tool for R&D and 
innovation based on regional growth (McCann/
Ortega-Argilés 2013; Wintjes/Hollanders 2011). 
EU funding given through Horizon 2020 can cre-
ate synergies with national programs by pushing 
important issues from the European to the national 
political agenda which are otherwise not discussed 
at the national level because of a lack of informa-
tion or local knowledge. However, the participa-
tion of the new member states in EU policy mak-
ing – especially in the areas connected to science, 
technology, and innovation – is very weak. Often, 
they even do not have the capacity to analyze their 
own R&D and innovation potential and to induce 
policy actions to improve their competitiveness on 
their own. In response to this situation, the Euro-
pean Commission started the smart specialization 
strategy tying the financing from the European 
Structural Funds to the ability to identify smart 
specialization priorities. Although TA and smart 
specialization cannot be easily compared, the de-
bates in the Central and Eastern countries show 
that TA is often tightly connected to innovation 
policy (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Lithuania) and 
less often with research policy (Hungary). Thus, 
the smart specialization processes can provide 
sustainable amounts of money to implement tech-
nology-based innovation programs. Further, trans-
parent, well organized and evidence-based de-
bates over smart specialization priorities can clear 
the road for further debates on the opportunities 
and risks of specific technologies and innovation 
paths. The Knowledge Economy Forum, a not for 
profit organization in Lithuania uniting business 
companies, research institutes and policy experts 
and a partner in the PACITA project, was involved 
in debates on smart specialization priorities from 
the very beginning and is now planning to initi-
ate a further debate with parliamentarians over the 
technologies behind those priorities. In the Czech 
Republic, the Technology Center ASCR (also a 
PACITA partner) acts as a technology transfer of-
fice and can also be one of the implementing bod-
ies for smart specialization strategies. The strong 
orientation of S&T policy to induce innovation 
strategies can be used as an entry point for TA to 
bring in strategic knowledge and help organize 
a discourse on feasible and sustainable national 
technology priorities.
A second factor supporting national reflec-
tions on TA is the mutual learning induced by Eu-
ropean cooperation and exchange. Although many 
of the experts involved in the national PACITA ac-
tivities were skeptical about the possibilities to in-
duce institutional structures of knowledge-based 
policy making, there was a great eagerness to 
learn about TA methods, to understand develop-
ments in other countries, and to initiate transdis-
ciplinary research projects. This is demonstrated 
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(see van Est et al. in this volume). Thus a prag-
matic approach is proposed here: Instead of trying 
to persuade the parliament or government to es-
tablish a TA unit or to foresee a yearly budget and 
long-term responsibilities, a potential TA “seed 
bed” institution should concentrate on finding its 
“first client,” be it parliament, the government, a 
ministry, the Science Academy or even individual 
politicians. It should start to establish contractual 
or personal relationships to other organizations, 
try to deliver high-quality TA products, and show-
case their value. The model of implementation 
that the countries choose is much less important 
than the transition strategy they develop. Part of 
such a strategy might be the definition of tempo-
rary functions which can be performed in the spe-
cific national context and can thus provide a solid 
basis to institutionalize TA in the future.
Such a transitional strategy of TA can in-
clude the following roles:
a) TA as a “content marketer” “selling” sci-
ence-based evidence,
b) TA as an “eyes opener” of future options,
c) TA as a “lobby organization” to establish 
knowledge-based decision making,
d) TA as a “knowledge sharer” in an internation-
al knowledge exchange network.
TA as a content marketer takes into account the 
existing barriers to establishing a transparent 
knowledge-based process of advising policy 
making. It nevertheless tries constantly to feed in 
knowledge as well as to offer procedures for an 
open and transparent discourse to policy making 
within the limits of the available financial and hu-
man resources. It can aim at training measures to 
create TA awareness in policy making by giving 
profound explanations on policy choices and on 
the benefits and constrains of debated technolo-
gies. It can target the issues which are on the cur-
rent political agendas. The function will also have 
its own challenges: It can imply a constant push-
ing of relevant information to politicians, analyz-
ing why evidence was either not used or was re-
jected, and then test the process again with other 
methods or modified content. This function might 
be called a “stealth” approach where TA methods 
are used to give evidence on decisions which are 
already on a short-term political agenda, while 
by the very large number of participants and their 
feedback given in practitioner training workshops 
and summer schools of the PACITA project. The 
project created a strong network of a wider Euro-
pean TA community, including related infrastruc-
tures such as the European TA portal.3
On the one hand, the partners from Central 
and Eastern Europe contributed to this network 
by offering their specific perspective to the inter-
national TA discourse. On the other hand, they 
formed a separate unit where they shared prob-
lems and experiences from recent developments 
in S&T policy making and discussed main obsta-
cles and opportunities for establishing TA.
There is some risk that such cooperation will 
diminish with the end of the PACITA project in 
the future. These partners are therefore now eager-
ly looking for opportunities to continue the coop-
eration in this wider TA network, e.g., by partici-
pation in further TA-related EU-funded projects.
5 An Incremental Way Forward: 
A Transitional Function for TA
Discussions on ways to achieve an institutional-
ization of TA in Central and Eastern European 
countries revealed different strategies depending 
on each political context. When there is already 
some “research based TA” experience available, 
such as from strong links with the respective sci-
ence academy, these activities can naturally serve 
as a starting point: Colleagues from the Czech 
Republic and Hungary are inclined to follow that 
approach. In other countries even the rudimenta-
ry practice of TA has to be built up from scratch; 
in this case, civil society organizations may take 
the lead. The discussions triggered by PACITA 
in Lithuania and Bulgaria led to the first steps 
towards a network-based model characterized 
by awareness-raising campaigns, proactive ap-
proaches by potential candidates for institution-
alization, and strong cooperation with national 
cross-disciplinary organizations like think tanks, 
analytic centers, and policy institutions (Kozarev 
2012; Leichteris/Stumbrytė 2012).
All in all, it appears to be premature for Cen-
tral and Eastern European countries to simply start 
discussing different organizational models of TA, 
be they connected to parliament or government 
SCHWERPUNKT
Technikfolgenabschätzung – Theorie und Praxis 24. Jg., Heft 1, Februar 2015  Seite 51
postponing the direct promotion of institutional-
ization of TA. Content marketing should concen-
trate on the delivery of high-quality content and 
thus prepare the ground for an institutionalization 
initiative by “making advocates” for TA.
TA as an eyes opener shall give politicians 
a glimpse of what is going on at the EU level or 
in other European countries and will raise aware-
ness of important issues. TA can be understood 
as a broad set of practices aimed at informing, 
shaping, and prioritizing technology policies and 
innovation strategies by deliberately appraising 
in advance their wider social, environmental, 
and economic implications (Ely et al. 2014). 
That means that TA is a forward looking tool. 
During the transition period, new countries can 
concentrate their efforts on pushing some ques-
tions which are not seen as being relevant in na-
tional parliaments but which are eagerly debated 
in parliaments of other countries. It should not be 
overused or lead to the provision of complex re-
search. It should be oriented more to the dissem-
ination of already existing and widely available 
knowledge beyond a national context.
TA as a lobby organization shall aim at 
building up a coalition of TA practitioners, pol-
icy consultants, and research institutes. It does 
not defend particular interests, but puts issues 
with medium-term importance on the political 
agenda that have so far not been taken up. Tak-
ing input from the European Agenda as well as 
support with regard to existing studies and re-
search from a European network will be crucial. 
Networking shall be used intensively to make 
personal relationships with policy makers and to 
form a generally positive public opinion toward 
evidence-based policy making. If the resources 
allow for it, policy evaluations can be performed, 
showing the shortcomings of current policies and 
providing general recommendations for action.
TA as a knowledge sharer shall concentrate 
on cross-border European exchange. There will 
always be a constant need for various examples 
of how one or another issue is solved in other 
countries. If Germany, Austria, The Netherlands, 
or some other TA countries can afford large-scale 
research on the impact of technologies developed 
in their countries on society in general, a more fea-
sible solution in the case of Central and Eastern 
countries – given their budgetary constraints and 
undeveloped R&D systems – is to adapt knowl-
edge that already exists in the EU to the local 
context. Thus, the cross-European cooperation of 
TA-like institutions, the exchange of information 
on parliamentary TA issues, and the sharing of re-
search results among TA institutions is important.
All of these transitional functions and roles 
clearly require an actor or a group of actors 
equipped with a minimum of institutional support 
to take up this role. In this respect the discussions 
and debates initiated by the PACITA project in the 
Central and Eastern European countries have pro-
vided at least the ground for follow-up activities 
in the above-mentioned sense. Groups connected 
to the analysis of R&D policy in the Academies 
of Sciences as now visible in the Czech Republic 
and Hungary show a growing interest in TA. They 
may be able to take over this role for a period of 
time even without stronger support from policy 
makers. The role can also be taken over by single 
NGOs or a network of actors interested in TA as 
was proposed for Bulgaria and Lithuania. In the 
long term, all these activities will hopefully con-
tribute to the establishment of national coalitions 
of TA supporters, including national research in-
stitutes, NGOs, and business associations. The 
integration of such actors in a European network 
seems to be crucial to make initiatives sustain-
able, not the least by including more national ac-
tors in EU-funded TA-related research.
Notes
1) Nearly all initiatives in problem-oriented research 
for policy consulting are managed by the Ministry 
of Education and Science of Lithuania and their 
analytical center MOSTA. However, despite its 
high ambitions, there is still a missing link be-
tween science and the societal and political uptake 
of scientific knowledge. One interesting example 
was the preparation of a foresight action called 
“Learning Lithuania 2030” (MOSTA 2011). The 
action struggled hard with the transformation of 
its results into policy making, but ultimately the 
results were not reflected in the corresponding 
policy documents. Further, there are some activi-
ties to popularize science in society: Some are led 
by the Lithuanian Academy of Sciences, which 
coordinates a consortium of universities. Others 
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HNIO – Hungarian National Innovation Office, 2014: 
NEKIFUT Project: New Report on the Hungarian 
Research Infrastructure is Available – Latest Trends, 
Disciplines, Recommendations; http://www.nih.gov.
hu/strategy/news/nekifut-project-new (download 
19.12.14)
Horizon 2020, 2014: What is Horizon 2020? http://
ec.europa.eu/programmes/horizon2020/en/what-hori-
zon-2020 (download 22.12.14)
Kozarev, V., 2012: Explorative Country Study: Bulgar-
ia. In: Hennen, L.; Nierling, L. (eds.): Expanding the 
TA-landscape Report. PACITA Collaborative Project 
on Mobilisation and Mutual Learning Actions in Eu-
ropean Parliamentary Technology Assessment (FP7)
Leichteris, E.; Stumbrytė, G., 2012: Explorative 
Country Study: Lithuania. In: Hennen, L.; Nierling, 
L. (eds.): Expanding the TA-landscape Report. PACI-
TA Collaborative Project on Mobilisation and Mutual 
Learning Actions in European Parliamentary Tech-
nology Assessment (FP7)
LMES – Lithuanian Ministry of Education and Sci-
ence, 2014: Integrated Science, Studies and Business 
Centres (Valleys); http://www.smm.lt/web/en/sci-
ence1/science_1 (download 19.12.14)
McCann, P.; Ortega-Argiles, R., 2013: Modern Re-
gional Innovation Policy. In: Cambridge Journal of Re-
gions, Economy and Society 6/2 (2013), pp. 187–216
Melnikas, B.; Jakubavicius, A.; Leichteris, E. et al., 
2011: Žinių ekonomikos kūrimas: Inovacijų paramos 
sistema. Vilnius
Mintrom, M., 1997: Policy Entrepreneurs and the Dif-
fusion of Innovation. In: American Journal of Politi-
cal Science 41/3 (1997), pp. 738–770
MOSTA – Mokslo ir studijų stebėsenos ir analizės 
centras, 2011: Lietuvos mokslo ir studijų ateities 
vizija: Mokslioji Lietuva 2030. Vilnius, pp. 1–8
Nentwich, M.; Peissl, W.; Sotoudeh, M., 2012: Parlia-
mentary TA in Austria. In: Ganzevles, J.; van Est, R. 
(eds.): TA Practices in Europe Report. PACITA Col-
laborative Project on Mobilisation and Mutual Learn-
ing Actions in European Parliamentary Technology 
Assessment (FP7)
PVI – Pilietinės visuomenės institutas, 2014: Lietuvos 
visuomenės 2013 m. pilietinės galios indeksas
Reid, A.; Besagirskas, S.; Biekša, M. et al., 2012: A 
Contribution to Priority Setting for Future Research, 
Studies and Innovation in Lithuania: Report of an Ex-
pert Group to the Ministry of Education and Science 
are more informally organized as “science popu-
larization networks” consisting of NGOs, youth 
organizations, and others.
2) The recent organizational evaluation of the Re-
search Council of Lithuania (RCL) renewed the 
interest of this institution in policy making. One 
of the main findings of the evaluation’s report 
stated that: “The RCL has a dual role as a fund-
ing agency and as a provider of policy advice, but 
the former dominates the latter and that results in 
the underutilization of a valuable voice within the 
national system” (Feely et al. 2014, p. 6; further 
pp. 20–21). Thus, the RCL might become another 
important player in science-based policy advice.
3) http://technology-assessment.info/
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Technology Assessment in the 
USA: Distributed Institutional 
Governance
by Jathan Sadowski and David H. Guston, 
Arizona State University
In the US, there is a lack of a centralized tech-
nology assessment (TA) capacity, which effec-
tively moves the US back in time, pre-Office of 
Technology Assessment, when TA functions 
existed but were so decentralized and varied 
that they were hardly recognized as such. 
There is no primary organization, public or pri-
vate, to innovate new methods, establish best 
practices, or provide policy guidance. Instead, 
there are disparate organizations, the connec-
tions among which cannot even be called a 
network. This article will describe three dis-
crete – but at times overlapping, interacting, 
and complementary – institutional settings 
where activities one could recognize as TA are 
occurring: government agencies, non-govern-
mental organizations, and academic research 
centers. The paper will conclude with a brief 
discussion of the challenges and roadblocks 
to institutionalized TA in the US.
1 Introduction
When one thinks of institutionalized technolo-
gy assessment (TA), whether in the context of 
the United States or elsewhere, one invariably 
calls to mind the Office of Technology Assess-
ment (OTA). In service to the US Congress, OTA 
was the first and largest “parliamentary” TA of-
fice. Scholars, journalists, and participants have 
often written on its history and methods (see 
Bimber 1996; Guston 2003; Hill 1997; Keiper 
2004; Kunkle 1995) – and for good reason, since 
it marks an important, and still unique, experi-
ment in TA. OTA’s origins reach back to the early 
1960s1 when tensions flared between the execu-
tive and the congressional branches of the federal 
government about access to technical and scien-
tific advice (Bimber/Guston 1995). After much 
debate in Congress about what methods and 
styles of advice legislators needed at their dispos-
al, the Technology Assessment Act, which would 
establish OTA, eventually passed and President 
